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Is it true that ‘…if man did not die, if he lived forever, if there were no such thing as death, 
there would be no religion’ (Feuerbach, 1851, 1967, 33)? Are we so scared of death that we 
try to pursue symbolic and literal immortality? This intriguing book aims to shed light on 
Feuerbach’s contention – and the more recent assertions of Terror Management Theory 
empirically, and by means of some ingeniously thought-out methods. Of course, anyone 
expecting simple and definitive answers to these questions will be disappointed – but 
probably shouldn’t expect a clear-cut resolution to matters which have occupied the minds of 
thinkers such as Feuerbach, Freud, Becker and Marx, to name a few. 
The greatest strengths of the book, in my opinion, are its comprehensiveness, rigour and 
creativity in experimental design. It is clearly based on a doctoral thesis and leaves no stone 
unturned in addressing a number of fundamental issues, before introducing the original 
experiments the authors conducted to shed light on their research questions. The book starts 
out (as it should) with the perennial questions of how to define religiosity and death anxiety 
(Chapter 1), before reviewing thanatocentric (death-focused) theories of religion from Tylor 
(1871) to Becker (1973) to Terror Management Theory (Chapter 2). The important question 
of how to measure faith and fear is the topic of Chapter 3. Much of these chapters cover 
familiar ground for psychologists and sociologists of religion. 
The book is a bit too thesis-like in places and would have benefited from more editing here 
and there. For instance, there’s a bit too much detail about measurement in Chapter 3 for the 
general reader, and one gets a little bogged down. There are also calculations and formulae 
in the text which don’t render the findings particularly accessible to the layperson (e.g. the 
statistics in chapter 4). Anyone interested in this level of detail could presumably read the 
original thesis. 
Obviously, it would do a disservice to the authors to reveal too much about the main 
conclusions drawn from the studies they reviewed and conducted. Suffice it to say, however, 
that people are perhaps not as afraid of death as thanatocentric theories of religion posit. In 
general, people are more afraid of illness, injury, animals and public speaking (94) than they 
are of death, though of course there are huge variations among individuals. Correlational 
studies show that religious individuals are less death anxious, ‘keeping thanatocentric 
theories alive’ (131), but the real question is whether death anxiety could be manipulated in 
order to demonstrate causal effects on religious and supernatural belief (and vice versa). 
Again, without wishing to reveal too much, the authors are to be congratulated for the 
complexity they bring to the research questions, specifically for comparing the roles of implicit 
and explicit beliefs in death anxiety. As they point out, there is more to what people believe 
than what they tell researchers – or indeed themselves! Jong and Halberstadt’s inventive way 
of tapping implicit beliefs allows them to adduce evidence showing that nonbelievers may 
implicitly accept the supernatural beliefs that explicitly deny (147–148). In some ways this is 
redolent of the tendency for many individuals to be angry with a god whose very existence 
they overtly repudiate. 
I found the final chapter, ‘The Future of Immortality, Literal and Symbolic’, with its musings 
about alternative forms of immortality, extremely interesting. I felt more could have been 
made of the fact that while belief in God is declining, belief in heaven (or some kind of 
afterlife) is not (179–180). As the authors say, there is clearly a ‘gap between atheism and 
extinctivism’ (the belief that personal consciousness is terminated at death). The topics of 
cryonic preservation, whole brain emulation and forms of social media that allow individuals 
to post from beyond the grave could have been fruitfully and entertainingly expanded upon. 
I felt that the key concept of faith in general and its particular manifestation in scientism could 
have been explicitly examined somewhere in the book, perhaps in the final chapter. The 
authors allude to faith in the reference to the Epistle to the Hebrews but the concept of faith, 
so foundational to research in this domain, required more than a passing reference: ‘Literal 
immortality projects –regardless of whether the immortality is conferred by a sovereign God, 
an immortal soul, a special fruit, an alchemical concoction, or a cabal of biomedical scientists 
– all seem to require the conviction of things, unseen, the assurance of things hoped for’ 
(184). 
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